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Abstract 
Traditionally, cognitive psychology has assumed a disembodied learner and 
thinker. However, an emerging approach known as embodiment posits that seemingly 
irrelevant motor or perceptual aspects of a task can affect higher-level cognition. The 
findings from such embodiment studies have also been shown to extend into real-world 
settings. For example, children who were taught mathematical concepts while required to 
make gestures consistent with the problem’s solution were more likely, on average, to 
apply the mathematical concepts correctly in the future (Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-
Meadow, 2008). For this specific study, the area of causal learning was examined. 
The primary goal of this specific study was to investigate whether elements of 
embodiment, and any mechanisms therein, would be found in the area of causal learning. 
That is, would motor actions irrelevant to determining causal relationships affect an 
individual’s causal learning? In a paradigm similar to that of Goedert and Spellman 
(2005), participants learned about the effects of different liquids on plant blooming on a 
trial-by-trial basis. Two separate liquids were used with differing causal power values, 
one a non-causal condition in which there was no relation between the liquid being used 
and plant blooming and one in which the use of the liquid was associated with a small 
increase in plant blooming. During the experiment, participants saw a liquid being 
applied to the plant or not (i.e., cause present vs. absent). In half of the conditions the 
cause-effect relation proceeded from left to right (cause  effect) with a liquid shown on 
the left side of the computer screen, pouring onto a plant on the right and during the other 
half of the conditions the cause-effect relation was reversed (effect  cause). Participants 
then made a prediction as to whether the plant would bloom and received feedback as to 
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whether the plant bloomed. At the end of the series of trials, they made a causal judgment 
regarding how effective they believed the liquid was in causing plant blooming. In order 
to assess embodiment effects, participants were randomly sorted into one of three 
movement conditions in which they moved marbles left-to-right, right-to-left, or 
performed no movements at all. Participants in the movement condition performed the 
movements throughout the experiment. A secondary goal of the experiment was to 
determine the mechanism of any observed embodiment effects by assessing reaction time 
and eye-movements. An issue with microphone sensitivity rendered reaction times 
unmeasurable, however, eye-movements were able to be analyzed.  
Because of an order effect in the causal ratings, I analyzed the causal ratings 
participants performed first, but did not find an effect of embodiment. The data did not 
support the hypotheses and an effect of contingency was not found; furthermore, the 
contingency effect trended in the direction opposite the hypothesis. However, eye 
tracking data revealed a significant interaction of place fixation by trial type, suggesting 
participants spent more time looking at goal-oriented directions. This study serves as a 
preliminary examination of embodiment in causal learning and suggests that a refinement 
of the methodologies used is necessary.  
 
Keywords: causal learning, embodiment, eye-tracking, causal power 
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General Introduction 
Cognitive psychology is primarily focused on the study of mental processes 
occurring within the mind (Pylyshyn, 1984; Uttal, 2003). Traditionally, cognitive 
psychology assumes humans to be information processors and under this view, sensory 
information is first translated into a symbolic representation that the mind can then 
process (Newell, 1994; see Figure 1 below). Cognitive psychology attempts to 
understand the nature of these symbolic representations and the cognitive processes that 
operate on them (Pylyshyn, 1984; Uttal, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of box-and-arrow diagram of information processing 
 
The traditional cognitive approach is exemplified in a box-and-arrow model 
describing the stages of information processing (Sternberg, 1969; see Figure 1 above). In 
the simplified model above, an external sensory input is translated into a mental 
representation and passed through several modules that each function separately in 
processing the information. Each module receives its input, completes its function, and 
passes along its output as the input to the next module. For example, assume someone is 
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asked for his or her age. Following from the box-and-arrow model above, the question 
itself would represent the external sensory input, which is translated into a symbolic 
mental representation so that the mind could begin to process it. The next step would 
include a retrieval of necessary information from long-term memory with regard to what 
the correct age, which may then be followed by a decision-making process as to how to 
respond (e.g., verbally or by showing one’s age with one’s hands). After the decision to 
verbalize the response is made, the result would enter the response preparation module, 
which would then lead to the final verbal response.  
Each of the boxes in the box-and-arrow diagram above are considered modules, 
areas separate from one another that cannot influence each other’s processing (e.g., 
Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984; Uttal, 2003). It is important to note that only the initial 
sensory input is external, with the following translation of the input and cognitive 
processes all occurring within the mind. From this perspective, there is no reason for 
seemingly irrelevant aspects of perceptual characteristics and motor demands of a task to 
influence processes operating on these symbolic mental representations. Admittedly, this 
serial view of processing is an oversimplified depiction of how the mind works and many 
models of cognitive processing posit a more parallel and interconnected processing (for a 
review see Thomas & McClelland, 2008). However, even more parallel and 
interconnected models have generally ignored motor and perceptual influences on higher-
level cognition (c.f., Barsalou et al., 2003). An emerging body of literature, however, 
demonstrates that irrelevant perceptual and motor aspects of a task do influence higher-
level cognition (e.g., Anderson et al., 2012; Hegarty, 2004; Martin, 2007; Thomas & 
Lleras, 2009). 
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Irrelevant Perceptual and Motor Characteristics Affect Cognition 
An alternative framework to traditional cognitive psychology that has emerged in 
the last 15 to 20 years is an embodied cognition approach (for a review see Davis & 
Markman, 2012). From an embodiment perspective, seemingly irrelevant perceptual and 
motor aspects of a task can in fact influence cognition because many cognitive processes 
are rooted within the body’s interactions with its environment (Anderson et al., 2012; 
Hegarty, 2004; Martin, 2007; Thomas & Lleras, 2009). The framework suggests that 
these associations between the body, action, and environment are much more 
interconnected and fluid than traditionally thought (Anderson et al., 2012; Hegarty, 2004; 
Martin, 2007; Thomas & Lleras, 2009; see Smith & Sheya, 2010, for a discussion of this 
theoretical shift).  
In one demonstration of irrelevant perceptual characteristics on mathematical 
reasoning, participants judged the validity of algebraic equations (Landy & Goldstone, 
2007). The researchers constructed mathematical and non-mathematical permutations of 
equations. The mathematical permutations changed the result of the equation due to the 
order for operations. For example some participants saw the following: 
(1) 3+2 * 4+1 = 12     or  (2) 2+3 * 1+4 = 9 
In the example above, equations 1 and 2 would have different results because of 
the order of operations. Critically, some permutations were spatial in nature rather than 
mathematical. For example, some participants saw the following permutations that 
preserved the order of operations, but varied in the spacing of the elements: 
(3) 3 + 2*4 + 1 = 12    or  (4) 3+2 * 4+1 = 12 
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 In the example above, both equations 3 and 4 would have the same result, 
however, equation 4 makes it more difficult to follow the order of operations based on the 
spatial layout of the equation. In the experiment, participants saw one equation at a time, 
with a result, and judged whether it was correct. Despite the overall irrelevance of these 
non-mathematical groupings, on average accuracy was highest when the non-
mathematical grouping (i.e., spatial layout) supported the mathematical grouping (i.e., 
order of operations; Landy & Goldstone, 2007). This finding suggests that the perceptual 
layout of a problem can positively or negatively influence mathematical performance.  
While Landy and Goldstone (2007) evaluated perceptual influences on higher 
level cognition, other methodological paradigms elucidate the effects that motor actions 
have on higher-level cognition. In one such paradigm, participants moved marbles up and 
down while engaged in memory retrieval tasks (Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010). During the 
experiment, participants recalled negative, neutral, or positive memories. On average, 
memory retrieval was faster when the direction of marble motion was congruent with the 
valence of the memory—that is, upward movement led to faster retrieval of positive 
memories and downward movement led to faster retrieval of negative memories. When 
prompted with valence-neutral cues, on average, participants retrieved more positive 
memories when moving marbles up and more negative memories when moving them 
down. Thus, a simple motor task influenced people’s ability to recall memories with a 
specific valence (Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010).  
The same marble moving paradigm was utilized in demonstrating the relationship 
between abstract words and motor actions (Casasanto & Lozano, 2007). Participants 
recited stories that had either metaphorical spatial content (e.g., “my grades got better”) 
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or literal spatial content (e.g., “the temperature went up”) while moving marbles in 
specified directions (i.e., up, down, right, left). Participants’ audio recordings were 
examined for instances of verbal disfluency, defined as a clause containing cases of 
repeats, fillers, repairs, or insertions. Disfluencies occurred in less than 1% of the uttered 
clauses in trials in which there were schema-congruent marble movements (e.g., upward 
movement during, “my grades got better”), as compared to 62% of uttered clauses during 
trials in which there were schema-incongruent marble movements. A similar effect was 
seen when participants were told to move marbles and read abstract words that had 
spatial components. Marble movement was fastest when the direction of movement was 
congruent with the implied spatial direction of the word (e.g., upward movement for 
genius, downward movement for gloomy). These findings are examples of the motor-
meaning congruity effect, in which motor representations help represent abstract concepts 
beyond the role of a purely conceptual or linguistic representation (Casasanto & Lozano, 
2007).  
Other methodologies have also been used to examine the effects of embodiment 
on higher-level cognition. For example, in one experiment, participants were presented 
with a difficult problem-solving task while their eye movements were continuously 
monitored (Thomas & Lleras, 2007). Occasionally, their eye movements would be 
guided, via a separate visual-tracking task, in either a pattern related to the problem’s 
solution or an unrelated pattern. Participants reported that they were unaware of any 
relationship between the separate tracking task and the problem-solving task. However, 
those who received visual guidance consistent with the problem’s solution were more 
likely to solve the problem (Thomas & Lleras, 2007). Similar effects have been observed 
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for guided hand movements (Thomas & Lleras, 2009). Thus, these seemingly unrelated 
guided eye and hand movements positively affect the higher-cognitive problem-solving 
abilities of participants. 
These effects of motor movements extend to real-world education settings. For 
example, in one experiment (Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2008), children were 
taught new mathematical concepts and during learning were required to either make 
gestures consistent with the problem’s solution or no gesture at all. When given an 
assessment afterwards, children in the gesturing group were, on average, more likely to 
apply the mathematical knowledge correctly. Thus motor movements have the potential 
to improve mathematical reasoning (Cook, et al., 2008).  
Why might embodiment affect higher-level cognition? 
There are several hypotheses regarding why embodiment affects higher-order 
cognition. Barsalou and colleagues (2003) argued that congruency between cognitive 
tasks and perceptual and motor states leads to more effective stimulus processing, which 
results in the task requiring fewer processing resources. More specifically, Thomas 
(2013) suggested that motor movements congruent with the correct solution in a 
cognitive problem free up spatial working memory resources. As previously discussed, 
having participants move their eyes in a pattern consistent with a problem’s solution 
increases the odds of solving that problem (Thomas & Lleras, 2007). However, this 
facilitative effect disappears when participants simultaneously perform a spatial working 
memory task, but not when they simultaneously perform a verbal working memory task 
(Thomas, 2013). This result suggests that if spatial working memory is somehow 
overloaded, it will hinder the embodied representations from facilitating problem-solving 
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(Thomas, 2013). Thus, spatial working memory may mediate the facilitative effects of 
action on problem-solving. 
A second possibility is that embodiment effects result from changes in how an 
individual directs his or her attention. Evidence for this idea comes from experiments 
showing that greater attention is allocated to space near the hands (Reed, et al., 2006; see 
also Baldaur & Deubel, 2008; Festman, et al., 2013). It seems to be the case that more 
attention is allocated toward the hands because the hands are the primary tools with 
which we interact with our environment (Reed, Grubb, & Steele, 2006). These effects of 
movement and hand location may be a mechanism for the effects of guided eye and hand 
movement on problem-solving (Thomas & Lleras, 2007, 2009). The guided movements 
of the eyes and hands may facilitate attention to the correct solutions of the problem 
(Baldauf & Deubel, 2008; Festman et al., 2013; Reed, et al., 2006; Thomas & Lleras, 
2007; 2009).   
Freed-up working memory resources, congruent representational states, and 
changes in the distribution of attention all refer to potential cognitive mediators of 
perceptual and motor effects on higher-level cognition. What neural mechanisms might 
underlie these cognitive effects?  Seemingly irrelevant aspects of perceptual and motor 
tasks may affect higher-level cognition because of shared neural resources (Anderson et 
al., 2012; Chafee & Crowe, 2013). Anderson, and colleagues (2012) put forth an 
evolutionary argument that basic motor and perceptual processes, which emerged earlier 
in our evolutionary history, have dedicated neural architecture. However, higher-level 
cognitive functions, which evolved later, were laid upon this existing neural architecture. 
Evidence for this idea comes from studies demonstrating the recruitment of areas of the 
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motor cortex for higher-level cognitive tasks. For example, both the manipulation of 
physical objects with the hands and reading comprehension recruit similar cortical areas 
(Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010).  
Chafee and Crowe (2013) articulate a specific theory of shared neural resources 
for spatial representation in the parietal cortex and review evidence for an overlapping 
hierarchy of spatial representations. This hierarchy spans from sensorimotor signals 
highly related to stimuli or movements, to sensorimotor signals modified to facilitate 
cognitive processes (such as those found in decision processing and working memory), 
and finally to the representation of abstract spatial information independent of 
sensorimotor signals. According to this view, the higher-level cognitive signals stem 
from and are built upon lower-level sensorimotor signals (Chafee & Crowe, 2013).  
It is important to note that the above theories may not be inconsistent with one 
another. Instead, it might be the case that these embodiment effects are due to an 
interaction of all of these mechanisms. More specifically, embodiment effects may be due 
to the freeing up of working memory (Thomas, 2013) and a preferential allocation of 
attention (Festman et al., 2013; Baldauf & Deubel, 2008; Reed, Grubb, & Steele, 2006; 
Thomas  Lleras, 2007; 2009), with these cognitive effects mediated by shared neural 
resources (Anderson et al., 2012; Chafee & Crowe, 2013). 
Embodiment and Causal Learning 
Even though there have been demonstrated effects of embodiment on several 
higher-level cognitive processes, as well as some theories as to why we might expect to 
see such effects, many research areas prominent in traditional cognitive psychology have 
yet to be assessed from an embodied perspective. One such area is causal learning, which 
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looks at how people learn the relationship between cause and effect. For example, 
suppose a hunter-gatherer society is going through an arduous famine. A woman of the 
group decides to quell her hunger by eating a handful of red berries found on a local 
bush, only to suddenly die a day later. It is imperative for the rest of the group’s members 
to learn from this mistake and not to repeat it in order to ensure the survival and success 
of their society (Rutter, 2007; Allan, 1980). 
When assessing causal relationships from contingency information, it is often 
helpful to refer to a contingency table (Table 1). The contingency table has four separate 
cells. Cell A corresponds to the number of times when the cause and effect are both 
present. For example, if we consider how often death occurs (the effect) after 
consumption of the red berries (the cause), the value would be represented in Cell A of 
Table 1. Cell B represents when the cause is present and the effect is absent; cell C 
corresponds to when the cause is absent and the effect is present; cell D represents when 
both the cause and outcome are absent. By using the frequency of events in each of the 
cells of the contingency table, we can calculate the contingency between eating the red 
berry and death. The value of all the cells in Table 1 must be known in order to correctly 
calculate the contingency between these binary events (Allan, 1980). However, when 
asked to examine plausible causes, people often put greatest weight on information in 
Cell A of the contingency table (Mandel & Lehman, 1998).  
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Table 1  
2x2 Contingency Table 
 Effect Present Effect Absent 
Cause Present A B 
Cause Absent C D 
 
Although there are many ways in which the frequency information from Table 1 
might be combined to assess the contingency – and subsequently, the causal relationship 
– between two events (e.g., Hattori & Oaksford, 2007), the theoretical approach 
dominating recent work in the area of causal learning is Cheng’s (1997) Causal Power 
Theory.1 In order to understand causal power, one must first understand Allan’s (1980) 
delta P: 
Equation 1. 
Δ 𝑃 =  𝑃(𝐸|C) − P(E|¬𝐶) 
In the above equation, 𝑃(𝐸|C) represents the probability (P) of the effect (E), 
given the cause (|C), and P(E|¬C) represents the probability (P) of the effect (E), given 
that the cause is absent (|¬C). An effect is dependent on the cause if the probability of the 
effect given the cause is larger than the probability of the effect in the absence of the 
                                                        
1 Bayesian models can be used to assess how people make inferences about systems of 
causal relationships (Griffiths & Tennenbaum, 2001). Because Cheng’s (1997) causal power can 
be a point estimate of Griffiths & Tenenbaum’s (2001) causal strength, I will be using causal 
power as the normative standard regarding how people should both use and combine frequency 
information.  
 13 
 
cause. This is also known as a facilitative or a generative cause. Similarly, a preventive or 
an inhibitory cause is one in which the probability of the effect is greater when the cause 
is absent than when it is present (i.e., the value of ∆P is negative; Cheng, 1997).  
Cheng’s (1997) power PC model expands upon Allan’s (Δ 𝑃) by going beyond 
pure covariation to an estimate of causal power, which can be estimated from covariation 
by dividing Δ 𝑃 by one minus the base rate occurrence of the outcome. Generative causal 
power (p) is represented mathematically (Cheng, 1997) as:  
Equation 2. 
𝑝 =  
𝑃(𝐸|C) − P(E|¬𝐶)
1 − 𝑃(𝐸|¬𝐶)
 
Even though effects of embodiment have been found in various areas of cognition 
(for a review, see Anderson et al., 2012), to date, no one has examined whether such 
effects are present in causal learning. Theories of causal learning from contingency, 
including Cheng’s normative (1997) causal power theory, do not predict effects of 
embodiment. Specifically, no one has assessed whether simple movements, irrelevant to 
the task, can influence our ability to detect causal relationships.  
Current Study 
The primary goal of the present study was to determine whether motor actions 
irrelevant to determining causal relationships affect causal learning. A secondary goal of 
the experiment was to determine the mechanism of any observed embodiment effects by 
assessing reaction time and eye-movements. In a paradigm similar to that of Goedert & 
Spellman (2005), participants learned about the effects of different liquids on plant 
blooming on a trial-by-trial basis. On each trial, participants viewed an event representing 
one of the cells of the 2x2 contingency table (Table 1): They saw a liquid being applied to 
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the plant or not (i.e., cause present vs. absent). They then made a prediction as to whether 
the plant would bloom and received feedback as to whether the plant bloomed. Over a 
series of trials, they received the complete frequency information from the 2x2 
contingency table. At the end of the series of trials, they made a causal judgment 
regarding how effective they believed the liquid was in causing plant blooming.  
Both the direction of the cause-effect relationship and the direction of motor 
actions were manipulated in the experiment. The direction of the cause-effect relationship 
was manipulated within-subjects (see Figure 2 below). In one condition the cause-effect 
relation proceeded from left to right (cause  effect): a liquid appeared on the left side of 
the computer screen, pouring onto a plant on the right. In a second condition the cause-
effect relation proceeded from right to left (effect  cause): a liquid appeared on the 
right side of the computer screen, pouring onto a plant on the left.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Figure 2. Two directions of causal elements presented 
 
During the trials, participants made irrelevant motor movements that were either 
congruent or incongruent with the direction of the cause and effect variables by moving 
marbles either left to right or right to left (after Casasanto & Djikstra, 2010; Casasanto & 
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Lozano, 2007). These manipulations produced two conditions in which the irrelevant 
motor movements were congruent with the causal direction and two in which they were 
incongruent (Table 2). Additionally, a control condition without movement was included 
as an assessment for baseline causal learning without motor action. I predicted that 
movements congruent with the causal direction would facilitate causal learning and that 
movements incongruent with the causal direction would hinder causal learning.  
Table 2 
Congruent and incongruent conditions found in the task.  
 
Marble Movement 
Causal Direction 
Cause  Effect 
Causal Direction 
Effect  Cause 
Left  Right Congruent Incongruent 
Right  Left Incongruent Congruent 
 
In order to test causal learning, I used two contingency conditions. Tables 3 and 4 
below depict the contingency tables for the two contingency conditions. The causal 
power of the first condition was 0, denoting a non-contingent condition in which there is 
no relation between the liquid being used and plant blooming. The causal power of the 
second condition was 0.25, denoting a contingent condition in which the use of the liquid 
was associated with a small increase in plant blooming.  
Table 3 
2x2 Contingency Table for the 0 Causal Power Condition 
 Effect Present Effect Absent 
Cause Present 6 3 
Cause Absent 2 1 
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Table 4  
2x2 Contingency Table for the 0.25 Causal Power Condition 
 Effect Present Effect Absent 
Cause Present 5 3 
Cause Absent 2 2 
 
These contingency values were chosen based on data showing that participants 
correctly discriminated between them 30% of the time (Allan et al., 2008). Thus, the 
contingencies were discriminable, but it was a relatively difficult discrimination, which 
should prevent floor or ceiling effects. The key prediction was that participants’ ability to 
discriminate between these two contingency conditions would be facilitated by 
movements congruent with the causal direction and potentially hurt by movements 
incongruent with the causal direction. 
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Method 
Participants 
In order to determine the number of participants needed for this study, an a priori 
power analysis was performed to estimate the sample size needed to detect the between-
within interaction in a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA using G*Power 3.1.7 (Buchner et al., 
2009). No published studies had examined this exact interaction and thus I powered a 
small-to-medium effect ( = 0.03) for the interaction, with a correlation among repeated 
measures of 0.36 (based on previous causal learning studies in Dr. Goedert’s laboratory). 
The a priori power analysis revealed that a total sample size of 75 participants would be 
necessary to achieve 80% power at an α of 0.05. 
Eighty-four undergraduate students (24 men; 60 women) from Seton Hall 
University’s Department of Psychology participant pool took part in the experiment 
either to fulfill a course requirement or for extra credit. All participants provided written 
informed consent. Because handedness may affect embodiment (e.g., Casasanto, 2009), 
only individuals scoring as right-handed were allowed to participate. Participants 
completed a prescreening survey and only right-handed participants (scoring above a 0 on 
the revised Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; see Dragovic, 2004 for the exact scale and 
see Appendix A for its psychometric properties) were allowed to take part in the study.    
Design 
The experiment was a 2 (causal direction: left-to-right, right-to-left) X 2 
(contingency: 0.00, 0.25) X 3 (movement direction: left-to-right, right-to-left, none) X 4 
(order) mixed factorial design. The direction of causal elements and contingency were 
within-groups factors while movement direction and order were between-groups factors. 
2
p
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The order variable reflected a Latin-square counterbalancing of the within-group 
conditions. 
Materials  
Participants sat in front of a computer for the duration of the experiment. A 
microphone and two boxes, one full with marbles and one empty, were placed in front of 
the participants. All stimuli were presented and behavioral responses collected using the 
computer program E-Prime (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).  A Tobii X120 
eye-tracker, mounted below the computer screen, tracked participants’ eye movements 
throughout the entire experiment at a rate of 60 Hz. 
Procedure  
Causal Learning Task. The causal cover story asked the participant to imagine 
cleaning out his or her garage and finding unlabeled containers with liquids in them. The 
participant’s task was to determine whether or not the liquids had an effect on plant 
growth (see Appendix B for complete cover story; Goedert & Spellman, 2005). 
Participants saw each contingency value (0.00, 0.25) twice, once with each casual 
direction (0.00 with cause  effect; 0.00 with effect  cause; 0.25 with cause  effect 
0.25 with effect  cause). This resulted in a total of four blocks of 12 trials each with a 
different colored liquid used for each block of trials.  
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Figure 3. A sample trial from the contingency task, separated by a fixation screen. 
A visual depiction of the task can be seen in Figure 3. The participant saw a 
prediction screen showing the liquid (the cause) either being poured onto the plant (the 
effect) or not. The participant then predicted whether the plant would bloom by saying 
“yes”, indicating that the plant will bloom, or “no” indicating that the plant would not 
bloom, directly into a microphone attached to an E-Prime stimulus response box. When 
the participant vocalized a response, it triggered the end of the prediction screen and E-
Prime recorded the reaction time (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
Simultaneously, the experimenter, seated behind the participant, recorded the 
participant’s response using a wireless keyboard. After vocalizing his or her response, the 
participant received feedback as to whether or not the plant bloomed (1000 ms).  After 
each block of trials, participants rated how effective the liquid was in producing plant 
blooming on a scale from 0 to 100 by vocalizing their responses (see Appendix C for 
actual scale), with 0 representing the liquid had no effect on plant growth and 100 
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representing the liquid always caused plant growth. Participants could use any number in 
between if they thought the liquid had some effect, but did not always cause, plant 
blooming.  
Marble-Moving Task. While performing the causal learning task, participants 
also performed a variation of the marble-moving task (Casasanto & Djikstra, 2010; 
Casasanto & Lozano, 2007). An example of the setup and movement for an observer in 
the left-to-right movement condition can be seen in Figure 4 below. The right-to-left 
movement condition would be the exact reverse of what is shown in Figure 4. Seated in 
front of the computer monitor, participants found two boxes on either side of them; one 
was filled with marbles. Because word cues indicating spatial locations produce shifts of 
attention that can impact reaction time (Dudschig et al., 2013), marble boxes were 
referred to by color (white/black) instead of spatial locations (left/right). Participants in 
the movement condition moved one marble in each hand from the starting box (the box 
with the marbles) to the destination box (the box with no marbles) to the sound of a 
metronome. The metronome sounded at 30 beats-per-minute, which resulted in the 
movement of 30 marbles with each hand per minute. This timing was chosen based on 
pilot testing indicating that this was the fastest speed at which participants could move 
the marbles and still pay attention to the causal learning task. In the no movement 
condition, the participant’s hands remained stationary and thus there was no direction of 
marble movement and instead only the direction of causal elements varied.  
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Figure 4. Depiction of marble movement paradigm from left-to-right used in the task.  
 
Experimental Trials. Participants began with six practice trials using a different 
colored liquid to familiarize them with simultaneously performing the marble moving 
and contingency learning task. The practice trials used a causal power (p = 0.50), which 
is different from the causal power used in the actual experiment (p = 0.00, p = 0.25). 
After the practice trials were completed, the participants began with the experimental 
conditions. Prior to the beginning of each block of experimental trials, participants in the 
movement conditions transferred marbles for 30 seconds to re-acclimate to the marble 
moving task and continued the movements through the prediction screens.  
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Results and Discussion 
Embodiment in Causal Judgments? 
The primary dependent measure for detecting embodiment in causal learning was the 
participants’ causal ratings of the four liquids.  
   Preliminary analyses revealed significant order effects. The 2 (causal direction) x 
3 (movement direction) x 2 (contingency) x 4 (order) mixed ANOVA yielded an 
interaction between contingency, causal direction, and order, F (3,72) = 3.31, p = 0.024, 
𝜂𝑝
2= 0.12, and no other effects, all ps > 0.12 (See Appendix C for complete statistics on 
nonsignificant effects). While every effort was made to interpret the order effects, this 
interaction was not clearly interpretable. Full details of the order analyses are presented in 
Appendix C. Because of the effect of order, further analyses were computed using only 
the condition that participants completed first, essentially treating the data as a fully 
between-groups experiment.  
Figure 5 depicts the means of participants’ first ratings by contingency and 
movement congruency, with the congruent condition representing participants’ ratings 
when the direction of marble movement and causal elements matched up and the 
incongruent condition representing participants’ ratings when the direction of marble 
movement and causal elements differed. It was hypothesized that participants’ causal 
ratings would be least accurate in the incongruent condition and most accurate in the 
congruent condition, with the no movement condition serving as a baseline control 
condition for the causal ratings. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants would 
rate the 0 causal power condition closer to 0 and the 0.25 causal power condition closer 
to 0.25 in the congruent condition. In the incongruent condition, it was expected that the 
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participants would not discriminate between the 0 and 0.25 contingency, rating them 
closer together. However, the actual results did not align with the hypothesized results. 
Table 5 depicts the means of the first ratings and standard deviations by cause direction 
and movement.  
The 2 (contingency) x 2 (causal direction) x 3 (movement direction) between 
groups ANOVA yielded no significant effects (all ps > 0.238; See Appendix D for 
complete statistics on nonsignificant effects). Specifically, the predicted interaction 
between contingency, causal direction, and movement condition was non-significant, F 
(2,72) = 0.11, p = 0.893, 𝜂𝑝
2= 0.01. From Figure 5, we see that the means across 
conditions are almost identical. There is no difference among the causal ratings in each 
subgroup (congruent, incongruent, no movement), suggesting that the embodiment 
manipulation did not work. Even though the main effect of contingency did not reach 
significance (F (1,72) = 1.42, p = 0.238, 𝜂𝑝
2= 0.02), we can see that participants’ mean 
causal ratings were trending in the opposite direction of those predicted, with participants 
rating the zero causal power condition as higher, on average, than the 0.25 causal power 
condition. This result suggests that the contingency manipulation did not work either.   
  
 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Means of causal ratings by contingency and movement direction. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean.  
 
Table 5 
 
Means of first ratings by movement condition (Left-to-Right, Right-to-Left, No 
Movement), causal direction, and contingency (p=0, p = 0.25) 
 
  Cause Direction 
Condition Contingency R -> L L -> R 
Left-to-Right p = 0 68.5714 (8.52) 66.11 (20.28) 
 p = 0.25 65.43 (11.75) 64.17 (18.55) 
Right-to-Left p = 0 76.25 (10.31) 64.90 (23.81) 
 p = 0.25 62.14 (11.85) 55.83 (26.91) 
No Movement p = 0 61.5 (26.146) 70.4 (27.72) 
 p = 0.25 65.33 (21.09) 62.86 (11.13) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
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A potential explanation for the difficult to interpret behavioral results is the 
outcome density effect. According to the outcome density effect, an individual judges a 
relationship as more causal when the frequency of the effect is higher (Allan, Siegel, & 
Tangen, 2005). Referencing Tables 3 and 4 above, we can see that the 0 contingency 
condition, a non-causal condition, had a higher base rate of the outcome (8) than that of 
the causal 0.25 contingency condition (7). This could be a potential reason as to why the 
causal ratings for the 0 contingency condition were higher across all groups as compared 
to the 0.25 contingency condition and thus the outcome density effect could potentially 
be a key component causing the uninterpretable results in the behavioral data.   
Exploring Mechanisms of Embodiment Effects 
Even though no effects of embodiment were observed in the behavioral data, 
reaction time and eye movement data could still provide insight into potential underlying 
mechanisms of embodiment. However, an issue with the microphone’s sensitivity to end 
a trial when a participant vocalized his/her response led to the inability of RT data to be 
used for analysis; therefore, only the eye-tracking data could be analyzed. 
Eye-Tracking Data Pre-Processing 
 The eye-tracking dependent measure were the time participants spent viewing 
each side of the screen during prediction screen trials, which was broken down by trial in 
order to compare whether the participants were spending more time looking at the cause 
(the liquid) or the effect (the plant) variable. Only eye movements during the prediction 
screens were analyzed because they were the only screens in the experiment that 
contained solely pictures without any words. This was important as words could induce a 
left-to-right reading bias (Casasanto, 2009) and would thus affect the overall proportion 
of time spent viewing either side of the screen.   
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The eye-tracking data were cleaned prior to analysis. Individual trials were 
eliminated under two scenarios: 1) if the prediction RT was less than 250 ms because this 
is too early in the trial for semantic processing to have been executed (Eberhard et al., 
1995), and 2) if the RT was more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean RT for 
participants in that condition.   
Within the eye tracking data, a multilevel mixed-effects linear regression was 
performed modelling participant intercepts as the random effect. There was a significant 
interaction of causal direction of elements and place fixation (F (1,167) = 4.37, p = 0.038, 
Cohen’s d = 0.02), with participants spending more time fixating on the goal/effect 
variable (the plant; M = 1580.59, SD = 1836.09) than on the cause variable (the liquid; M 
= 707.52, SD = 1847.95). This interaction is depicted in Figure 6 below. When the causal 
direction of elements went from left to right, the participants fixated longer on the plant 
located on the right side. Similarly, when the causal direction of elements went from right 
to left, the participants fixated longer on the plant located on the left side. This finding is 
supported by the literature showing that individuals allocate more time to the side of 
visual space where the effect variable is located (Grant & Spivey, 2003; Thomas & 
Lleras, 2007; 2009).  
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Figure 6. Means of time spent fixating (ms) in the interaction of causal direction of 
elements and place fixation. Error bars depict standard errors.  
 
There was also a significant interaction of place fixation by trial type (F (1,167) = 
3.93, p = 0.049, Cohen’s d = -0.01), irrespective of causal direction or movement 
condition, participants spent more time fixating on the right half of the screen when the 
cause was present (M = 1196.68, SD = 1594.60) and more time fixating on the left half of 
the screen when the cause was absent (M = 1255.78, SD = 1585.87). Lastly, there was a 
significant effect of place fixation (F (1,167) = 11.82, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = -0.03), with 
participants spending more time fixating on the right side of the screen (M = 1195.51, SD 
= 1771.01) than on the left half (M = 1148.22, SD = 1772.14). A potential reason for this 
could be due to our left-to-right reading convention; however, there were no words on the 
screen during the trials in which eye movements were recorded. Nevertheless, even in a 
picture book, one might expect individuals who speak languages in which reading flows 
from left-to-right to “read” the pictures from left-to-right and therefore spend a longer 
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time fixating on the right half of the screen. Nevertheless, the relevancy of this effect to 
the current study is minimal and a revised methodology is necessary to explore it in 
further detail.  
The main predicted interaction between movement condition, causal direction of 
elements, and place fixation was non-significant (F (1,72) = 1.54, p = 0.218, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.06). 
Table 6 below depicts the mean time spent fixating (ms) by movement condition and 
causal direction of elements. No other effects or interactions reached significance (all ps 
> 0.058). 
Table 6 
Means of time (ms) spent fixating (Leftward, Rightward) by movement condition (Left to 
Right, Right to Left, No Movement) and causal direction (L->R, R-> L).  
Cause 
Direction Fixation Left-to-Right Right-to-Left No Movement 
L -> R Leftward 827.22 (1836.01) 962.06 (1621.77) 701.82 (1662.00) 
L -> R Rightward 
1685.81 
(1836.01) 
1690.75 
(1621.77) 
1651.24 
(1673.27) 
R -> L Leftward 
1539.84 
(1742.69) 
1926.94 
(2030.08) 907.32 (2111.01) 
R -> L Rightward 529.67 (1734.60) 
666.51 
(2028.778) 543.03 (2279.76) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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General Discussion 
It was hypothesized that congruent movements of causal direction and motor 
action would facilitate causal learning and that incongruent movements of causal 
direction and motor action would hinder causal learning. However, both the behavioral 
data and eye tracking data failed to support this hypothesis. Specifically, in regards to the 
behavioral data, it was clear that certain methodological shortcomings affected the 
interpretability of the data.  First, as had been pointed out by several of the participants in 
the study, the participants performed many actions simultaneously during the experiment, 
which may have distracted their attention away from learning about the causal 
relationship between the liquids and the plant. During the experiment, the participants 
had to focus on moving marbles and vocalizing their responses, which were plagued by 
issues concerning the microphone sensitivity, all while attempting to learn about the 
causal relationships.  
Even though the behavioral data did not allow for interpretable results, the eye-
tracking data hinted at some underlying embodiment effects present. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that changes to the methodology used in the experiment are necessary for clearer, 
more interpretable and generalizable results. In an attempt to correct some of these 
potential limitations found in the current study, a follow-up study has begun examining 
the same hypothesis as the current study. However, new contingency information has 
been chosen so that the data from the follow-up experiment are not confounded by the 
outcome density effect previously discussed. Specifically, in the new study, the frequency 
of the effect is higher in the causal contingency than in the non-causal contingency.  
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Furthermore, due to the microphone’s limited sensitivity and difficulties in 
assessing reaction times, the use of a microphone has been removed from the follow-up 
experiment. Instead, participants simply vocalize their responses, which are inputted into 
E-Prime by the experimenter. This lets the experiment proceed without microphone 
issues as well as allowing for the participants to focus more of their attention on learning 
the causal relationships. Additionally, instead of using four different liquids, two liquids 
are shown twice, which permits a more direct comparison between groups. With these 
changes to the methodology, the follow-up experiment will be better suited to elucidate 
any effects in the future data, without falling victim to the outcome density effect and 
further uninterpretable results.   
Overall, as there have been numerous accounts of embodiment effects found in a 
wide variety of areas (Landy & Goldstone, 2007; Anderson, et al., 2012; Hegarty, 2004; 
Martin, 2007; Thomas & Lleras, 2009; Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010; Casasanto & Lozano, 
2007; Lakens et al., 2011), it would be premature to discount causal learning as an area in 
which embodiment effects may be found due to the results of this one experiment. 
Rather, taken into a larger context, this experiment can serve as a preliminary experiment 
providing insight into what methodologies can be used to further address whether 
embodiment effects are truly present in causal learning.  
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Appendix A 
The Revised Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Dragovic, 2004; Oldfield, 1971) has both 
high validity and reliability, with a test-retest reliability of 98.5% in 735 participants 
tested 18 months apart (Ransil & Schachter, 1994; Dragovic, 2004). It is scored by 
coding each of the eight responses in the following manner:  -50 = always left, -25 = 
usually left, 0 = no preference, 25 = usually right, 50 = always right. These values are 
then added up and divided by 4, to give a value ranging from -100 (complete left 
handedness) to +100 (complete right handedness). Only participants scoring 80 or higher, 
denoting a strongly right-handed individual, were allowed to participate (Dragovic, 2004; 
Oldfield, 1971). 
 38 
 
Appendix B 
Instructions for participant 
 
You were cleaning out your garage and found four colored liquids. You vaguely 
remember that some of these liquids might be plant fertilizers, plant herbicides, or they 
might have nothing to do with plants. You have decided to investigate the effect that 
these liquids have by pouring them onto a plant. 
 
On each trial you will see a plant with a liquid next to it. If the liquid is in the air, this 
indicates that it was used on the plant in that trial. If the liquid is on the ground, this 
indicates that it was NOT used on the plant in that trial. Your task will be to make a 
prediction (YES or NO) as to whether the plant will bloom. When you have made your 
prediction, simply verbalize your response. After making your prediction, you will 
receive feedback as to whether the plant bloomed or did not bloom.   
 
At several points throughout the experiment, you will be asked to rate the relationship 
between each of the liquids and plant blooming using the following scale  
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A rating of 0 corresponds to the liquid having no effect on plant blooming. 
A rating of +100 corresponds to the liquid always causing plant blooming.  
 
Before the experiment begins, I will have to calibrate the eye tracker to make sure it can 
follow your eye movements. During calibration, simply follow the red dot across the 
screen and make sure not to move your head.  
 
Do you have any questions? When the experiment is done you will be asked to complete 
a short questionnaire and then will be debriefed. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix C 
 
The contingency and causal direction variables were treated as within-groups 
variables and marble movement and group were treated as between-subjects variables. 
Although no effect of causal direction was found (F (1,72) = 2.412, p = 1.25, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .032), 
a significant interaction between contingency, causal direction, and order was found (F 
(3,72) = 3.312, p = 0.024, ηp2 = .121) indicating order effects. Bonferroni corrected post-
hoc tests yielded significant comparisons between direction of causal elements within 
groups, however, no significant differences between groups or between movement 
conditions was found. Descriptive statistics were further used in an attempt to interpret 
any systematic changes or differences evident in the data, however, none was found. In 
an attempt to further elucidate the order effects, analyses in the body of the paper were 
performed examining what causal conditions subjects did first. Table 7 below depicts the 
nonsignificant effects and interactions. Table 8 and 9 below depict the order interaction 
from the experiment. 
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Table C.1 
 
Statistics of non-significant effects for the order analysis 
 
Effect 
        
F     p-value 
       
     𝜂𝑝
2 
Contingency 1.22 0.274 0.02 
Contingency * Movement 0.43 0.653 0.01 
Contingency * Group 2.07 0.111 0.08 
Contingency * Movement * Group 0.36 0.899 0.03 
Cause Direction 0.99 0.322 0.01 
Cause Direction * Movement 1.23 0.299 0.03 
Cause Direction * Group 0.11 0.953 0.01 
Cause Direction * Movement * Group 1.43 0.216 0.11 
Cause Direction * Contingency 2.41 0.125 0.03 
Contingency * Cause Direction * Movement 0.87 0.424 0.02 
Contingency * Cause Direction * Group * Movement 1.26 0.289 0.10 
 
 
Table C.2 
 
Means of causal ratings by movement condition (Left to Right, Right to Left, No 
Movement), order, causal direction (L->R, R->L), and contingency (p=0, p=0.25) for the 
first and second order. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
 
Note. A * denotes significant Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests. 
 
  
   Order 1 Order 2 
   R->L L->R R->L L->R 
Left to Right p=0  68.33(13.92) 66.11(20.28) 68.57(8.52) 64.29(20.5) 
 p=0.25  71.67(20.16)* 49.44(22.00)* 59.29(20.90) 67.14(16.29) 
Right to Left p=0 
 
58.8(17.79) 64.9(23.81) 
76.25 
(10.31)** 40(29.44)** 
 p=0.25  53.5(23.93) 62(17.51) 51.25(16.52) 58.75(10.31) 
NoMovement p = 0  62.5(13.59) 61.5(26.15) 70.4(27.72) 69.8(15.50) 
 p=0.25  53.5(12.92) 46(19.55) 51(14.32)*** 73.6(9.86)*** 
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Table C.3 
 
Means of causal ratings by movement condition (Left to Right, Right to Left, No 
Movement), order, causal direction (L->R, R->L), and contingency (p=0, p=0.25) for the  
third and fourth order. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
Note. A * denotes significant Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests 
 
  
  
 
 
 
   Order 3 Order 4 
   R->L L->R R->L L->R 
Left to Right p=0  70.33(9.9)**** 45.83(21.31)**** 51.43 (27.04) 56.43 (20.35) 
 p=0.25  64.17(19.6) 64.17(18.55) 65.43 (11.75) 52.14 (24.98) 
Right to Left p=0  55(22.36) 64.17(29.57) 65 (11.18) 55.71 (30.88) 
 p=0.25  52.5(29.11) 55.83(26.91) 62.14 (11.85) 61.43 (13.45) 
NoMovement p = 0  64.17(33.23) 66.67(36.56) 62.86 (19.12) 55 (28.43) 
 p=0.25  64.17(34.12) 65.33(21.09) 62.86 (11.13) 65.71 (24.40) 
 43 
 
Appendix D 
 
Table D.1 
 
Statistics of non-significant effects for the behavioral analysis  
 
Effect          F   p-value 
       
    𝜂𝑝
2 
Movement 0.03 0.968 0.01 
Cause Direction 1.07 0.304 0.02 
Contingency 1.42 0.238 0.02 
Movement * Cause Direction 0.22 0.802 0.01 
Movement * Contingency 0.47 0.626 0.01 
Cause Direction * Contingency 0.43 0.514 0.01 
Movement * Cause Direction * Contingency 0.11 0.893 0.01 
 
